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Rearticulating Diplomatic Relationships: 
Contextualizing Tuvalu-Taiwan Relations
Jess Marinaccio
Diplomatic competition between Taiwan, or the Republic of China 
(ROC), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a common topic 
in research on the so-called developing world (Hu 2015; Yang 2011). 
For example, in recent discussions on the rise of China in the Pacific, 
scholars have advanced de-powering and empowering narratives in which 
either Taiwan-PRC infighting drives diplomatic action and the Pacific has 
little agency (see D’Arcy 2016) or Pacific nations are subjective agents 
that choose Taiwan or the PRC according to their preference (see Wesley- 
Smith and Porter 2010). A common theme in both analytical frameworks 
is a failure to acknowledge that Pacific-Taiwan-PRC relationships have 
always involved issues removed from Taiwan-PRC competition and as 
a result entail levels of complexity that are often overlooked. Thus, con-
textualizing these relationships reveals “entangled and intimate histories” 
that contest a static, one-dimensional view of Pacific-Asia diplomacy 
(Salesa 2016, 123).
Tuvalu is currently one of six Pacific nations (ie, Tuvalu, Kiribati, the 
Marshall Islands, Palau, Solomon Islands, and Nauru) that maintain for-
mal relations with Taiwan. Yet in scholarship on Taiwan, Tuvalu is typi-
cally discussed as merely one of Taiwan’s limited number of allies (Hu 
2015; Yang 2011), and even volumes examining Pacific-Taiwan-PRC 
diplomacy have neglected Tuvalu (see Wesley-Smith and Porter 2010). In 
research on Tuvalu, Taiwan and diplomacy are rarely emphasized, and 
recent scholarship has focused predominantly on climate change (see 
Goldsmith 2016). Consequently, in this article, I analyze official (ie, gov-
ernment) discourse from the Tuvalu-Taiwan relationship to address this 
research gap and show how this discourse has consistently structured and 
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reflected the nuanced and dynamic histories inherent in Tuvalu-Taiwan 
relations.
A Historical Background for Tuvalu-Taiwan Diplomacy
Tuvalu and Taiwan formally established diplomatic relations on 19 Sep-
tember 1979 (udn 1979). At that time, Tuvalu had recently become post-
colonial, having declared independence on 1 October 1978 after separat-
ing from Kiribati, to which it had been linked as part of Great Britain’s 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (Goldsmith 2012, 129). However, 
because it possessed historical or linguistic ties to Nauru, Kiribati, Tonga, 
Sāmoa, Banaba, and Fiji, Tuvalu was by no means an isolated player in 
the Pacific region after gaining independence (Beaulieu 2009; Lawson 
1989; Noricks 1981; K Teaiwa 2004). Furthermore, in the 1970s, there 
was a growing assertion both internationally and in Tuvalu of rights to 
Exclusive Economic Zones (eezs), which demarcated control of national 
marine resources (tnS 1979d, 1979e). Though Tuvalu did not emerge from 
colonization with everything it had hoped for from the British (Goldsmith 
2012), it did control extensive marine assets that many nations, especially 
the archipelagic and peninsular countries of East Asia, desperately hoped 
to access.
For its part, in 1979, Taiwan was nearing the end of a martial law 
period that began in 1949 with the retreat of Nationalist, or Kuomintang 
(kmt), forces from mainland China to Taiwan after their loss to Commu-
nist forces in the Chinese Civil War (Corcuff 2000). This era was preceded 
by a fifty-year period of Japanese colonization on Taiwan that ended with 
the conclusion of World War II, and scholars have suggested that the kmt 
retreat marked the transition from one period of colonial rule to another 
for Taiwan’s majority population (ie, Han Chinese who left the mainland 
beginning in the 1600s) (Muyard 2015, 24). This retreat also signaled 
Taiwan’s continued status as a settler colony vis-à-vis the archipelago’s 
indigenous peoples (Shih 2016). Furthermore, in 1979, Taiwan was reel-
ing after withdrawing from the United Nations (UN) in 1971 and sub-
sequently severing official ties with Japan and the United States. In this 
period, numerous countries established relations with the PRC, asserting 
that Taiwan belonged to that nation-state (Chu 2015, 707; Gao 1980).
It was in this context that in March 1979 Tuvalu’s government news-
paper, Tuvalu News Sheet (tnS), printed an article titled “Tuvalu’s Asian 
Diplomacy,” which highlights the rapid development of Tuvalu’s relation-
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ships with East Asian nations like Taiwan shortly after independence (tnS 
1979a). Contemporaneously, the Taiwan government began reporting on 
early diplomatic forays into Pacific nations, including Tuvalu. These news-
paper and government reports are frequently characterized by a narrative 
style that suggests the complexities of Pacific-Asia relationships at the time 
and provide a foundation from which more recent discourse on Tuvalu-
Taiwan relations can be temporally contextualized and complicated.
Given this background, I begin by outlining the Pacific studies ratio-
nale and methods structuring this article. Subsequently, I examine official 
Tuvaluan and Taiwanese narratives from the 1970s and 1980s to demon-
strate how early diplomacy was determined not by official maneuvering 
but by preexisting “trans-local” and individual connections and conflicts 
(Matsuda 2012, 5). Next, in analyzing Tuvaluan and Taiwanese leader-
ship statements from 2000 to the present, I show how diplomatic rhetoric 
has become more formalized and sketch how, more recently, Tuvalu and 
Taiwan have used each other to shape and fortify their national identi-
ties. However, I also highlight connections to earlier narratives, especially 
 consistent tension in Tuvaluan discourse due to fisheries conflicts with 
Taiwan and continued preoccupation in Taiwanese discourse regarding 
whether Taiwan is superior to Tuvalu. In the conclusion, I illustrate how 
articulations between early narratives and more recent discourse fore-
ground Tuvaluan and Pacific agency and show that Tuvalu-Taiwan rela-
tions have always both included and exceeded Taiwan-PRC competition.
Before moving forward, it is important to note that, due to archival 
gaps, official Taiwanese reports on diplomatic missions to Tuvalu do not 
appear after the late 1980s, while full-length leadership statements on 
Tuvalu are not available in paper or online collections until 2000. Addi-
tionally, archive holdings for state-run newspaper are incomplete after 
1992, and a critical mass of leadership statements only emerged after 
Tuvalu joined the United Nations in 2000. Hence, the 1990s are deliber-
ately excluded from analysis in this paper. However, thematic connections 
between the 1970s–1980s and 2000 to the present suggest that these peri-
ods are not wholly separate but are instead distinguished by shifts from 
trans-local and often informal discourse in the 1970s and 1980s to for-
malized diplomatic rhetoric more recently. News coverage from Tuvalu, 
which is available from 1976 to 1992, verifies this transition because, 
after the first visit by a Tuvaluan head of government to Taiwan in late 
1986, Tuvalu’s discourse transitioned in tone from narrative and informal 
to formal (Tuvalu Echoes 1986a, 1986b; udn 1986). 
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A Pacific Studies Rationale, Articulation Theory,  
and Discourse Analysis
Although Teresia Teaiwa identified the origins of Pacific studies in “ama-
teur ethnographies from . . . the seventeenth century [and] orientalist-
type scholarship” (2001, 348), Pacific studies traces its main roots to 
World War II, the Cold War, and the development of pragmatic interest 
in Pacific nations by Pacific Rim countries like the United States and Aus-
tralia (Wesley-Smith 1995). However, with the end of the Cold War and 
intellectual challenges from postcolonialism, postmodernism, and cul-
tural studies, Pacific studies has been required to demonstrate increased 
reflexivity and a “coherent conceptual basis” (Goss and Wesley-Smith 
2010, xiv–xv). Given this complex history, Terence Wesley-Smith iden-
tified three rationales possibly motivating research on the Pacific: the 
“laboratory rationale,” which “values the Pacific Islands and Pacific 
Islanders primarily as objects for study”; the “pragmatic rationale” 
embodied in “the need to know about the Pacific Islands places with 
which . . . metropolitan countries have to deal”; and the “empowerment 
rationale,” which is “more firmly grounded in indigenous experience” 
and aims to “incorporate multiple voices into . . . narratives” (1995, 128; 
2016, 157–159).1
Wesley-Smith noted that the “pragmatic rationale for Pacific studies 
has, no doubt, received a boost as a result of the rise of China in Oceania” 
(2016, 157), and recent works on the PRC in the Pacific (which inevitably 
include Taiwan) are often couched in the pragmatic language of strategic 
studies, as mentioned in the introduction. However, the empowerment 
rationale is also currently a major trajectory in Pacific studies, and in 
this paper, I focus on empowerment rather than pragmatism to evalu-
ate Tuvalu-Taiwan relations from an alternative perspective, whereby dis-
course emerging from both locations can be valued as equally legitimate 
and important.
From a conceptual and methodological perspective, an empowerment-
oriented Pacific studies emphasizes interdisciplinarity, comparativity, and 
indigenous epistemologies while also adopting indigenous frameworks, 
multi-sited ethnography, and articulation as key methods (K Teaiwa 2014, 
68; T Teaiwa 2010, 2017a). Because articulation theory is a flexible tool 
that accommodates complex pasts, presents, and futures while also pro-
viding the strategic potential to unsettle static ideas of society, politics, and 
culture, I adopt articulation as the main analytical mode in this article.
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Articulation theory was developed in cultural studies as a response to 
reductionism in Marxism, in which “every element in society . . . [was] 
reduced to . . . the operations of the corresponding mode of production” 
(Slack 1996, 116). Articulation is thus “a way of thinking the structures 
of what we know as a play of . . . fragments” (Slack 1996, 112), and it 
has been defined in Pacific contexts as “the sense that any socio-cultural 
ensemble that presents itself to us as a whole is actually a set of histori-
cal connections and disconnections” (Clifford 2003, 45). Teresia Teaiwa 
additionally stressed that applying articulation theory to Pacific histories 
“[provides] layers upon layers of contextualization [and] more accurately 
[represents] cultural and political complexity” (2005, 204). Consequently, 
I use articulation to frame Tuvalu-Taiwan diplomacy not as a unified 
whole but instead as an ensemble of contextually specific elements that 
connect and disconnect as they interact with dynamic historical, cultural, 
and political backgrounds.
Furthermore, because discourse, which is “an ensemble of ideas, con-
cepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physi-
cal phenomena” (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 175), is uniquely linked to 
an articulated view of society, I combine discourse analysis, or the study 
of “what talk is doing and achieving” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 5), with 
articulation. This integration demonstrates how juxtaposing bodies of 
talk illuminates shifting yet integrated characterizations of Tuvalu, Tai-
wan, and their relationship over time.
Building on this framework, in the remainder of this article, I first out-
line official Tuvaluan and Taiwanese discourse from the 1970s and 1980s. 
Subsequently, I analyze Tuvaluan and Taiwanese leadership statements 
from 2000 to the present, highlighting how elements in the two periods 
have continuously articulated and disarticulated.
Narrativizing Tuvalu-Taiwan Relations— 
1970s to 1980s
Official reporting from the beginnings of Tuvalu-Taiwan relations in the 
1970s and 1980s, which coincided with Tuvalu’s debut in international 
diplomatic circles and early Taiwan-government forays into the Pacific, is 
much less rigidly structured than current discourse on international affairs. 
Because no solidified understandings of Tuvalu-Taiwan diplomacy existed 
at the time, discourse in Tuvalu’s state-run newspaper and Taiwan-gov-
ernment reports frequently adopted a narrative mode, using storytelling 
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to conceptualize incipient relationships. This discourse evinces how early 
Tuvalu-Taiwan diplomacy (and Pacific-Asia diplomacy more broadly) was 
characterized by “multiple sites of trans-localism, [or] the specific linked 
places where direct engagements took place” (Matsuda 2012, 5). Both 
the narrative style adopted in early discourse and trans-localism are illus-
trated in the following subsections, which focus first on Tuvalu and then 
on Taiwan.
Tuvalu: Taiwanese “Drama on the High Seas”
Shortly after Tuvalu’s independence in 1978, reporting on diplomatic rela-
tions between Tuvalu and Asia—specifically South Korea, Japan, and Tai-
wan—was a feature of Tuvalu News Sheet, a periodical published from 
1976 to 1983 through Tuvalu’s Broadcasting and Information Division 
(Goldsmith 2016; tnS 1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1979f). The rapid develop-
ment of Tuvalu-Asia relationships was, in many instances, based on the 
need for East Asian nations to purchase fishing licenses so that vessels 
operated by their citizens could legally access Tuvalu’s sea territory. For 
example, one article in Tuvalu News Sheet notes that immediately after 
Tuvalu and Japan established diplomatic relations, “the Second Secretary 
in the Japanese Embassy at Suva . . . and the Assistant Manager of the 
Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Association” arrived in 
Tuvalu’s capital, Funafuti, to negotiate a fisheries licensing agreement (tnS 
1979b; for South Korea, see tnS 1979c).
Although these accounts accord with current analysis of Asian diplo-
macy in the Pacific that centers on fisheries (Aqorau 2015, 223; Izumi 
2010, 89–90), tnS reporting also suggests that it was not Asian govern-
ments who were catalysts in establishing relations with Tuvalu. Rather, it 
was interaction between the Tuvalu government and Asian fishing inter-
ests—which were often located in other Pacific places (typically American 
Sāmoa)—that required intervention by Asian governments (see lyg 1975, 
6; tnS 1979e). This challenges assumptions of unified national action in 
diplomacy, as Asian governments were often called on to intervene in sit-
uations in which they were not directly involved. It also highlights the 
trans-local nature of Pacific histories in which direct engagement between 
sites like Tuvalu and American Sāmoa forged connections between the 
governments of Tuvalu, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.
In Tuvalu News Sheet, this phenomenon was the subject of exten-
sive narrativization, especially in articles on Taiwanese fishing vessels, 
where Taiwanese fishing transgressions and Tuvaluan skill in detecting 
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trans gressions were serialized over several issues. These narratives, two 
of which I outline below, foreground the trans-local character of early 
Tuvalu-Taiwan interactions, as well as Tuvaluan agency. However, at the 
time, they also served a nationalizing agenda, underscoring Tuvalu’s uni-
fied action in the face of wayward Taiwanese fishing crews.
First, from 3 August to 31 October 1979, Tuvalu News Sheet printed at 
least five articles referencing the case of the Chyan Yeng No 21, a Taiwan-
ese fishing vessel based in Pago Pago, American Sāmoa, and contracted 
to Feng Ch’un Agents, which represented the US firm Starkist. The vessel 
was charged with fishing without a license inside the 200-mile economic 
resources zone of three Tuvaluan islands (Nanumaga, Vaitupu, and Funa-
futi), the ship’s captain was arrested, and the vessel was fined a$20,000 
(approximately us$22,548 at the time). The ship, crew, and captain were 
detained on Funafuti for five weeks before fines were finally paid and they 
were released (tnS 1979d, 1979e).
Tuvalu News Sheet’s retelling of the capture of the Chyan Yeng and the 
expertise of Tuvaluan authorities in discovering foul play not only high-
lights Tuvalu’s agency and Taiwan’s naivete in its illegal exploits but also 
depicts a united Tuvaluan nation-state: 
The vessel called at the capital—Funafuti—on late afternoon Monday July 16 
with what was reported to be engine trouble and water shortage. . . . The fol-
lowing afternoon, the police boarded the vessel and arrested the captain. . . .
Investigations prompted by the Attorney General and carried out by police, 
customs and fisheries officials, revealed that the ship was carrying 25 tons of 
fish, a portion of which was fresh and un-frozen. It was suspected that some 
of this fish may have been taken from Tuvalu waters, since Captain Shing has 
admitted to fishing about 70 miles off-shore from Nanumanga. He claims, 
however, that he believed the 200 mile economic resources zone to apply only 
to waters surrounding Funafuti. Nevertheless, it was reported that the vessel 
called at Vaitupu, which is within 200 miles of the capital, the previous week 
and it is believed that fish may also have been taken from waters near the 
island. (tnS 1979d) 
Additional articles on the incident highlight a lack of rapid Taiwan-gov-
ernment response to transgressions, and Tuvalu’s Secretary for Commerce 
and Natural Resources Feue Tipu is reported as proclaiming that “such 
problems could be avoided by the local issuance of fishing licenses, pro-
vided that foreign nations [were] cooperative in securing licensing agree-
ments with Government.” Tipu further warned that “[foreign govern-
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ments] . . . might want to better look after their interests by encouraging 
the institution of formal licensing agreements” (tnS 1979e). Interestingly, 
the issue of slow response to fishing crises was also integral to Taiwan-
government reports from the period (discussed in the next subsection), 
demonstrating a point of consonance in early Tuvaluan and Taiwanese 
discourse. 
A second and more dramatic incident is described in “Drama on the 
High Seas—Taiwanese Boat Escapes,” which was published on 23 Janu-
ary 1980, with a related article printed on 20 February of the same year 
(tnS 1980a, 1980b). These articles recount the tale of the Taiwanese fish-
ing vessel Tong Chou Kao Hsiung No 7 (also originating from American 
Sāmoa), which “appeared” and “disappeared” near the coast of the central 
Tuvaluan island Nukufetau. During this time, the ship’s crew requested 
supplies, and it was noted that fish on the vessel were “still fresh.” This led 
to a nationwide search for the ship involving even “a Fijian cargo boat [the 
mv Ai Sokula] running on a British Phosphate Commissioners’ charter to 
repatriate Tuvalu employees from Banaba.” The Ai Sokula spotted the 
Taiwanese vessel fishing near one of Tuvalu’s northern islands, Niutao, at 
which point “the Government issued instructions for her arrest,” and the 
ship’s captain “stole off in the middle of the night,” beginning “the coun-
try’s first troublesome scene at sea.” The story unfolds as follows: 
[The] Ai Sokula reported back that she had come alongside the Taiwanese ves-
sel, but although the Ai Sokula had put 2 men on board the vessel her master 
refused to comply with the instructions to head for Funafuti. 
The Government then instructed the Nivaga to leave as soon as possible to 
rendezvous with the Ai Sokula . . . , with instructions to escort the Taiwanese 
boat to Funafuti. . . . The following morning however, . . . the fishing vessel 
was nowhere in sight. It is believed that about midnight, the previous evening, 
the master of the boat hauled in his nets and extinguished his lights before sail-
ing away from the Ai Sokula which had been trying to detain her. . . . Follow-
ing this incident . . . the Government is preparing to take legal action against 
[the Tong Chou’s] master on several charges. (tnS 1980a) 
As with reporting on the Chyan Yeng, this narrativizing of “drama on the 
high seas” underscores Tuvalu’s agency in its ability to rally forces and 
track the Tong Chou, as well as Taiwanese folly in stopping for supplies at 
an island near which the Tong Chou was fishing illegally. 
Reporting on this incident also clearly demonstrates the trans-local 
links characterizing Tuvalu-Taiwan encounters shortly after Tuvalu’s 
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independence. In both narratives, private Taiwanese fishing vessels based 
in American Sāmoa and connected to the United States are involved in 
direct conflict with Tuvaluan officials or citizens who then call on the 
Taiwan government to resolve the issue through the purchase of fishing 
licenses. However, in the case of the Tong Chou, more extensive links 
and engagements are suggested when a Fijian boat carrying Tuvaluan citi-
zens employed in British mines in Banaba is enlisted in Tuvalu’s search 
for the boat. In this way, myriad locations and histories are entangled 
within a single high-seas pursuit, providing a tangible example of  Katerina 
 Teaiwa’s observation that Pacific histories involve the “movement of all 
kinds of bodies and materials” (2004, 220; see also Dvorak 2014, 352). 
Yet we also see how early discourse on illegal Taiwanese fishing in and 
around Tuvalu, as well as the need to assert and define the extent of Tuva-
lu’s Exclusive Economic Zone, served to naturalize Tuvalu’s identity as 
a nation-state, given that in each narrative, a series of Tuvaluan islands 
were articulated through common violations by the Taiwanese. This indi-
cates how trans-local relationships and conflicts could be used to solidify 
national identity, foreshadowing how official Tuvaluan discourse func-
tions today.
Taiwan: Our Expatriates in the South Pacific
For Taiwan, at least two records of oral hearings in which Taiwan’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs discussed Pacific diplomacy at the Taiwan Legisla-
ture are available for the 1970s and 1980s, specifically records for 1974 
and 1988. The 1974 report, which describes the first official Taiwanese 
delegation to the Pacific (lyg 1975, 6), does not mention Tuvalu, focus-
ing instead on Sāmoa, Tonga, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. However, this 
report dovetails with tnS articles and also shows how the Taiwan govern-
ment at the time was fixated on stories of Chinese or Taiwanese expatri-
ates (僑胞) in the Pacific.2 This underscores the importance of individual 
experiences to government discourse on Pacific-Taiwan relations. Much 
of this storytelling demonstrates official concern regarding whether expa-
triate loyalties were aligned with Taiwan or the PRC (see Heylen 2010, 
16–18; Shih 2011, 710), which seemingly confirms international-relations 
research in which Taiwan’s Pacific strategy is based on competition with 
the PRC (Topo 2014, 54). However, this storytelling also shows how, 
with the rise of nation-states in the Pacific-Asia region, governments were 
often scrambling to overtake or accommodate trans-local engagements 
already initiated by individual citizens or business interests (see also Smith 
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2012). With this in mind, before analyzing the 1988 record, which directly 
addresses Tuvalu, I first consider the 1974 report.
First, in the 1974 report, the problem of illegal fishing so dramatically 
outlined in Tuvalu News Sheet is also clearly explicated. For instance, 
Taiwan’s deputy minister of foreign affairs explained that two hundred 
Taiwanese fishing vessels were operating in American Sāmoa, bemoaning 
the complexities of fisheries regulations: 
Especially now that many countries have expanded their sea territories, we 
must remember that . . . it is easy for fishermen to cross into [these] territories 
when they are not paying attention. . . . [It] might be that some fishermen 
don’t know that the sea territories of various countries have expanded. . . .
[We] must make them pay attention to this. If we wait until they are detained 
or [items] confiscated, the losses are great. Whether to guarantee government 
rights or fishermen interests, we must take active measures. . . . [Our] reactions 
have been slow. (lyg 1975, 6–7, 13)3 
This explanation underscores a gap between Taiwanese fishermen in 
American Sāmoa and their government representation while also suggest-
ing how major changes in international policy during this period were far 
removed from the people most in danger of violating relevant regulations.
The 1974 report is also notably characterized by tales of Chinese or Tai-
wanese expatriates in locations visited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and, frequently, the success of even one expatriate is taken as indicative 
of a favorable atmosphere for foreign relations. For example, the dep-
uty minister related that in Sāmoa “all important economic activities are 
undertaken by the Chinese.” He also explained that “there is one expatri-
ate, Mr Chen,” who arranged a welcome party for the Taiwanese delega-
tion that was attended by all local ministers because “every week [Mr 
Chen] invites the local people to watch a free movie at his home; everyone 
knows [him]” (lyg 1975, 7–8). The deputy minister further surmised that 
“Fiji is friendly to [Taiwan]” because “Chinese expatriates have contrib-
uted to the Fiji economy” (lyg 1975, 8). He reported: 
Our expatriates are quite influential. I didn’t know . . . that the [Fijian] Prime 
Minister . . . wouldn’t have time to meet with me [during my visit]. . . . I dis-
cussed this with an expatriate. He . . . called straight over and arranged for a 
meeting the next day. (lyg 1975, 9) 
The Taiwan government’s use of individual expatriate experiences to 
understand diplomacy also illustrates how, at the time, it struggled with 
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ethnocentrism and even racism in foreign affairs. This is highlighted in the 
1974 report when government officials assessed the success of expatriates 
in the Pacific through narratives of intermarriage. For example, the deputy 
minister explained that “we don’t have racial prejudices, so we can inter-
act harmoniously with the local people,” after which he approvingly told 
the story of Wong Kee, an expatriate who married the daughter of a local 
chief in Sāmoa (lyg 1975, 8). Yet he also narrated the tale of an expatriate 
in Papua New Guinea that reads as both ethnocentric and racist: 
[Mr Chen] took a local aboriginal as his wife and they had a son with curly 
hair and black skin. . . . Mr Chen has forbidden his children to speak to the 
aborigines using aboriginal languages and has taught them using Cantonese. 
When he was on his deathbed, he told his son that he must take a Chinese 
woman as his wife, and his son did marry [such] a woman. They already 
have two sons whose skin is of a Chinese tone. They are truly patriotic. (lyg 
1975, 11) 
Notably, just as Tuvaluan newspaper articles on interactions with Tai-
wan are mediated not through government-to-government interactions but 
rather through trans-local engagements at the government-to-individual 
or government-to-group level, the Taiwan government’s earliest mission 
to the Pacific is also mediated through government-to-individual inter-
actions. This is because imaginings of Pacific relations are continuously 
articulated to the experiences of individual Chinese or Taiwanese expatri-
ates. Government discourse also demonstrates an ambivalence concerning 
how expatriates should comport themselves, specifically with regard to 
ethnicity and race, as tales of both integration into and assimilation of 
Pacific communities are proffered as examples of ideal behavior. Although 
this ambivalence may have been prompted by racial prejudice targeted 
against Pacific peoples with darker as opposed to lighter skin tones (lyg 
1975, 7), it also illustrates uncertainty regarding whether Taiwan should 
position itself as superior or equal to Pacific nations. This uncertainty is 
apparent in official discourse even today.
Although the 1974 report is rich with narratives from Taiwan’s first 
mission to the Pacific, Tuvalu is not specifically mentioned until a second 
record from 1988, when the Taiwan ambassador to Tonga and Tuvalu 
spoke before the Taiwan Legislature. By 1988, a more pragmatic, formal-
ized tone characterized reporting, and Tuvalu and Tonga were discussed 
vis-à-vis PRC encroachment, strategic positioning, and the necessity for 
Taiwan to compete with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Europe in 
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providing Pacific aid (lyg 1989, 281–284, 286–287). This signals move-
ment from the disparate and individually based elements of Pacific diplo-
macy apparent in 1974 toward a cohesive vision regarding which issues 
should constitute Pacific-Taiwan relations.
However, an exchange between the ambassador and Taiwanese legisla-
tors regarding aid to Tuvalu reveals how, even in 1988, Taiwan’s diplo-
matic discourse was still highly fragmented. During this exchange, the 
ambassador described a conversation with Tuvalu’s prime minister, Dr 
Tomasi Puapua, in which the prime minister requested Taiwan’s financial 
support for hotel construction. The ambassador explained that because 
Puapua was a doctor and “different from your average slippery politi-
cian,” it would be best to promptly provide funding so as to “[aid] the 
election of the . . . prime minister to another term” (lyg 1989, 284). This 
suggestion was met with strident criticism from Taiwanese legislators, but 
the varied perspectives reflected in their criticisms demonstrate disparate 
understandings of diplomacy with Tuvalu and the Pacific at large. One 
legislator, viewing Taiwan as a “great and impressive nation,” exclaimed 
that Taiwanese diplomats need not kowtow to allies simply out of fear 
they would sever relations (lyg 1989, 285). Another criticized the ambas-
sador for not being a “modern diplomat” who would understand that 
he must “not interfere in the domestic politics of other countries” and 
that swaying an election would be “a scandal among democratic nations” 
(lyg 1989, 286–287). Yet another legislator suggested that links between 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples and Pacific nations should be used to “pro-
mote Taiwan’s diplomatic work,” noting the need to examine claims that 
“Polynesians [originated] from the Asian mainland” (lyg 1989, 288).
Here, divergent conceptualizations articulate to Taiwan’s diplomacy in 
Tuvalu and the wider Pacific. These conceptualizations include continued 
belief in Taiwan as the true seat of the Chinese government and a powerful 
nation that must conduct itself as such in diplomacy, neoliberal concep-
tions of Taiwan as needing to exemplify a modern and democratic stance 
in international relations, and connections linking Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples to Pacific diplomacy. These ideas reveal multiple perspectives on 
what Taiwan’s national identity is and how it might best be expressed in 
the Pacific.
In fact, although tales of individual or small-group interactions char-
acterized discourse at the beginnings of Tuvalu-Taiwan allied relations, 
today, diplomatic discourse is more clearly fixated on considerations 
of identity. While early narratives mark the trans-local and fragmented 
460 the contemporary pacific • 31:2 (2019)
nature of relations, more recent accounts demonstrate how discourse on 
diplomacy is now a means of representing self through other, or, more 
specifically, of reinforcing national identity by defining how Tuvalu and 
Taiwan exist in relation to each other. 
Identifying Self in Tuvalu-Taiwan Relations— 
2000 to the Present
After the uncertain beginnings of Tuvalu-Taiwan relations—as under-
stood through narratives of rogue Taiwanese fishing vessels in Tuvalu 
News Sheet and Chinese or Taiwanese expatriates in Taiwan-government 
reports—discourse on more recent diplomatic relations, especially that 
found in leadership statements from 2000 to the present, has disarticu-
lated from trans-local explications. Now, it focuses on totalizing rhetoric 
in which each nation defines the other as a unified whole that reflects and 
refracts its own identity. However, contemporary discourse on Tuvalu-
Taiwan relations also clearly demonstrates articulation on two levels. 
First, this discourse is still connected to narratives from the 1970s and 
1980s. Second, in this discourse, Tuvalu and Taiwan continue to maintain 
complex imaginings of each other in which elements are articulated to or 
disarticulated from rhetoric based on changing domestic and international 
circumstances and to achieve varied objectives. Consequently, in the fol-
lowing two subsections, I outline how Tuvalu and Taiwan have identified 
self and other in more recent official discourse while simultaneously high-
lighting the articulation inherent in this process and connections to earlier 
narratives. 
Tuvalu: Taiwan as Enemy, Cause, Family
From 2000, when Tuvalu joined the United Nations, to the present, Tai-
wan has surfaced in various statements from high-level Tuvaluan govern-
ment officials and been multiply articulated to discourses of enmity, moral 
cause, and kinship, demonstrating Tuvalu’s complex regional, interna-
tional, and bilateral identities and how Tuvalu uses Taiwan to rhetorically 
fortify these identifications.
First, in Tuvalu’s regional fisheries statements, Taiwan has been articu-
lated to discourses of enmity and become symbolic of Pacific Rim powers 
attempting to wrest fishing rights from Tuvalu and the broader Pacific 
region. I outline this discourse first because it links to earlier tnS narra-
tives of tracking and detaining Taiwanese fishing vessels. For example, 
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at the twelfth Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission meeting 
in 2015, Elisala Pita, Tuvalu’s minister for natural resources at the time, 
commented:
Until just a few weeks ago the construction of our second vessel continued to 
be blocked by certain Commission members. . . . I would stress . . . that the 
recent unblocking of this process was not because these [Commission Mem-
bers, Cooperating Non-Members, and Participating Territories (ccms)] sud-
denly decided to respect and abide by the measures of this Commission. It 
was because, at the request of Tuvalu, [the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(pna)] threatened to prohibit fishing in pna waters by vessels of the ccms 
concerned. . . . I hope you will remember that this fishery takes place primarily 
in the Pacific Islands, and must be managed in a way that provides benefits to 
the people of that region. (2015b, 3)4 
Earlier that year, the nations with which Pita took issue had been iden-
tified as Japan and, most specifically, Taiwan (rnz 2015). Thus, in the 
1970s and 1980s, Taiwanese ships in Tuvalu waters unified the islands 
of Tuvalu (and even Fiji) in joint pursuit, and, in more recent discourse, 
Taiwan and its fisheries violations unite the Pacific region (or at least the 
pna) in cooperative action. Here, Taiwan serves as a symbolic outsider 
demarcating national Tuvaluan and regional Pacific interests.
Yet outside of fisheries meetings, and most visibly at the United Nations, 
Tuvalu’s discourse on Taiwan disarticulates from a history of fisheries 
disputes. Instead, Taiwan is a moral cause through which Tuvalu gains 
affective leverage by championing a nation that has been shunned in the 
UN structure. Karen McNamara noted that in UN climate-change nego-
tiations, Pacific nations control “considerable moral leverage” (2009, 8), 
and Tuvalu’s UN discourse on Taiwan is positioned to achieve a similar 
effect.5 For example, in 2002, then Governor General Sir Tomasi Puapua 
expressed Tuvalu’s hope, “as a peace-loving nation,” that “the right to 
self-determination of the people of the Republic of China and [their right] 
to join the United Nations [would] be urgently addressed.” If the United 
Nations did not ameliorate this issue, he added, it could not be seen as 
“universal” nor could it fulfill its charter to maintain “peace and security 
for all nations of the world” (unga 2002, 2). Ten years later, in 2011, 
then Prime Minister Willy Telavi similarly intoned that “collective efforts 
to strengthen and maintain peace across the globe [would] be meaningless, 
if the United Nations [continued] to turn blind eyes and deaf ears to Tai-
wan’s contribution” (unga 2011, 15). For Tuvalu, at the internationally 
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oriented United Nations, Taiwan is no longer a tool for building Pacific 
regional unity through discourse on fisheries transgressions; rather, it is 
used to identify Tuvalu as a moral actor on the world stage and is articu-
lated to a humanitarian cause that distinguishes Tuvalu, along with Tai-
wan’s sixteen other allies, among the United Nations’ numerous member 
states.
Finally, in Tuvalu’s bilateral leadership discourse, Taiwan is further dis-
articulated from themes of enmity and morality and even the concept of 
the nation-state itself. Here, Tuvalu rearticulates itself and its ally into a 
sweeping history in which Taiwan is neither an egregious intruder demar-
cating the insiders of Tuvalu and the wider Pacific nor a pitiable outsider 
denied admission to the United Nations but, instead, the ancestral home 
of Tuvalu and Polynesia. Thus, at the 2013 opening of the Tuvalu embassy 
in Taiwan, then Prime Minister Telavi explained: 
Tuvalu is the oldest ally for Taiwan in the Pacific region. But our ties are much 
older than this. Studies of the origins of the Polynesian languages of the Pacific, 
including Tuvaluan, suggest that they are strongly linked to the Indigenous 
Peoples of Taiwan. This connection extends back over 5,000 years. So in a 
way, the establishment of this Embassy is a symbolic homecoming for us. 
(Telavi 2013, 2) 
Although prompted by diplomatic considerations, Telavi’s articulation of 
Taiwan to a regional imagining that predates contemporary diplomacy 
unsettles national boundaries increasingly evident in Tuvaluan discourse 
from the 1970s to the present. It also highlights how early reports and 
more recent statements on Taiwan in Tuvalu indicate new perspectives 
on the Tuvalu-Taiwan relationship, illuminating broad historical and 
 geographic ties often missing from analysis of Pacific-Asia diplomacy 
(Salesa 2012, 400–402).
Taiwan: Tuvalu as Signifier of Oceanic Taiwan or Donor Taiwan
Digital records of Taiwanese leadership statements on Tuvalu are avail-
able beginning from 1992, which was during the presidency of Lee Ten g -
-hui, who later became Taiwan’s first democratically elected president in 
1996.6 However, these statements are brief and were typically published 
in the form of press releases. Given this, I focus on leadership statements 
spanning the presidential terms of Taiwan’s second and third directly 
elected presidents: Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), who represented the 
Democratic Progressive Party (dpp) and its movement toward Taiwan-
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ese independence, and Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), who fronted the more 
PRC-friendly kmt Party.7 In these bodies of discourse, Tuvalu has been 
articulated to sometimes radically different ideas. However, these leader-
ship statements all reflect official attempts to define Taiwan through its 
conduct of diplomacy with Tuvalu, as well as ambivalent ethnocentrism 
regarding Taiwan’s superiority to the Pacific, which is similar to rhetoric 
from the 1970s and 1980s.8 
Chen Shui-bian’s ascension to the presidency in 2000 represented the 
first peaceful transition of power in Taiwan. Although relations between 
Taiwan and the PRC were hardly peaceful during and directly after the 
kmt-controlled martial law period (1949–1987), the election of a dpp 
president was not a welcome change to the PRC, and wrestling over dip-
lomatic allies and Taiwan’s sovereign status was characteristic of Chen’s 
presidency (Yang 2011, 56–59, 68). During this period, Taiwanese leader-
ship statements demonstrate a consistent pattern of formulating a com-
mon identity for Tuvalu, the Pacific, and Taiwan so as to suggest a Tai-
wanese identity and national status independent from the PRC. Here, 
Chen adopted affective rhetoric that highlighted Austronesian linguistic 
ties between indigenous peoples in Taiwan and the Pacific, which recalls 
certain recommendations outlined in the 1988 Taiwan Legislature report 
discussed in the previous section.
A common theme in official Taiwanese discourse on Tuvalu is the pre-
sumed need to continually define Tuvalu and make it “knowable” before 
undertaking further discussion on Tuvalu-Taiwan relations. As posited by 
Chen, Tuvalu is small, possesses abundant marine resources, and is righ-
teous or peaceful (see Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 
2002). The first two characteristics appear in other leadership descriptions 
of Tuvalu, but the last is specifically highlighted by Chen and is indicative 
of the common identity he hoped to create for Tuvalu, the Pacific, and Tai-
wan, which was predicated on constructing Tuvalu and other Pacific allies 
as worthy of this shared identity. Consequently, in his typically effusive 
fashion, Chen explained: 
Tuvalu is the most peaceful country in the world and its people are [also] 
the most peaceful [in the world]. . . . The whole world should learn from the 
people of Tuvalu. If they did, there would be no war and world peace would be 
eternal. (Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2005) 
This definition of Tuvalu furthers Chen’s goal of then articulating Tai-
wan to Tuvalu and the Pacific through mutual ocean or island-nation 
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identities and utilizing Taiwan’s position as the purported origin of the 
Austronesian language group, which includes Pacific languages, to further 
bolster a united status (Mona 2007). Here, Chen’s strategy is similar to 
that adopted by Telavi at the opening ceremony for the Tuvalu embassy in 
Taiwan. However, Chen’s discourse is not aimed merely at creating bilat-
eral goodwill but also at articulating Taiwan into a Pacific regional vision 
that redefines Taiwan internationally. To this point, Chen explained that 
“the foundation for strong [Tuvalu-Taiwan] friendships” was the shared 
status of “Tuvaluans and Taiwanese [as] ocean peoples” (Office of the 
President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2002). Chen further declared: 
The Pacific Ocean . . . nurtured the Austronesian culture . . . as well as the pre-
cious and mutually supportive friendship between Taiwan and its Pacific allies. 
The vast Pacific Ocean has not created a barrier between us and has instead 
provided plentiful resources and become an ocean that we all depend on for 
survival. In the spirit of brotherhood and mutual trust and benefit, let us work 
diligently toward the creation of a better Pacific era. (Office of the President, 
Republic of China [Taiwan] 2006b) 
Although Chen was not above patronizing Tuvalu and Taiwan’s other 
Pacific allies (see Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 
2006a), his discursive strategies demonstrate attempts not to articulate 
Tuvalu and the Pacific to any specific ideas but rather to articulate Taiwan 
to Tuvalu and the Pacific so as to re-form Taiwan’s domestic, regional, and 
international position. Tuvalu moves in broad regional and international 
circles that allow it to connect Taiwan to multiple identities to achieve var-
ied ends. By contrast, Taiwan’s more circumscribed global standing neces-
sitates not the articulation of Tuvalu into multiple contexts but rather the 
articulation of Taiwan to Tuvalu and the Pacific to construct new possi-
bilities for national identification.
After Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election, the kmt Party regained power 
under President Ma Ying-jeou. Ma’s foreign policy was radically different 
from Chen’s; it was predicated on constructing a diplomatic truce with 
the PRC and positioning Taiwan as supportive of Pacific development 
 programs championed by traditional donors like Australia (Overton 2016; 
Yang 2011, 71). Thus, in contrast to Chen’s construction of a common 
Tuvalu- or Pacific-Taiwan identity, Ma developed separate but mutually 
constitutive identities for Tuvalu/the Pacific and Taiwan in which Taiwan 
was articulated to a respectable consortium of donor countries that dealt 
peaceably with the PRC: 
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Our viable diplomacy can allow us to win friendship and respect from our 
allies and gradually change our relations with mainland China. . . . From the 
perspective of international society, and especially in the South Pacific region, 
Australia has shown great admiration for us. This is a tremendous difference 
from three years ago when they would frequently criticize us. We have created 
a climate in which international society, Taiwan, and mainland China all win. 
(Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan] 2010a) 
In this discourse, Tuvalu is articulated into a group of so-called develop-
ing countries who offer certain advantages to Taiwan but also require Tai-
wan’s humanitarian assistance (Office of the President, Republic of China 
[Taiwan] 2010b). Taiwan’s Pacific allies are thus conceptually reimagined:
The difference between these six [Pacific] allies and [our] other allies is that 
they only became independent after 1979 [sic]. Furthermore, aside from Solo-
mon Islands, . . . a characteristic [of the Pacific allies] is that their populations 
are extremely small [and] their resources are relatively lacking. The countries 
are still developing or are even in a relatively low state of development. They 
therefore require aid from foreign countries or international society. As a 
nation in which average income is us$16,000, the ROC has a duty to provide 
aid. Additionally, although these [Pacific] countries are small, they still have a 
vote in international organizations. (Office of the President, Republic of China 
[Taiwan] 2010c) 
Similar to Chen, Ma used Tuvalu and Taiwan’s other Pacific allies to 
define Taiwan. However, in contrast to Chen, Ma’s discursive strategy 
is more aligned with discourse from the previously mentioned 1988 Tai-
wan Legislature report in which Taiwan was understood not in terms of 
Austronesian connections to Tuvalu but in terms of how an important, 
modern, and democratic nation should conduct international diplomacy.
As illustrated by Ma and Chen, recent Taiwanese leadership statements 
on Tuvalu evince striking disparities, which, like Tuvaluan discourse, show 
the fragmented and articulated nature of diplomatic alliances, especially 
as the discursive use of these alliances effects continuous and changing 
interpretations of their significance (Wood and Kroger 2000, 10–12). Also 
notable is how fragmented elements from this discourse connect back to 
government reports from 1974 and 1988. For example, different ideas 
of the Tuvalu-Taiwan relationship as explicated in the 1988 Taiwan Leg-
islature report surface in Chen and Ma’s divergent imaginings of how 
Pacific diplomacy should be conducted. Furthermore, given the ambiva-
lent ethnocentrism and racism found in the 1974 report, it is interesting 
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to consider the variance in how Chen and Ma used Tuvalu and other 
Pacific allies to build a national identity for Taiwan. While Chen discur-
sively bypassed ethnocentrism by imagining the possibility for one Pacific 
people, Ma rejected this conceptualization, seeing Taiwan as a beneficent 
donor separate from and above its Pacific allies. 
Conclusion: Articulating Diplomatic Relations  
Past and Present
The goals of articulation theory and discourse analysis are extraordinarily 
similar: Articulation illuminates contexts and demonstrates how conjoined 
fragments “might be re-articulated” to “[shape] intervention within a par-
ticular social formation” (Slack 1996, 112, 123), while discourse analysis 
“[contributes] to change in the way that people talk . . . [initiating] a 
change in practice” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 13). This political potential 
makes articulation and discourse analysis critical to Pacific studies and 
its work toward “empowerment for mutual exchange” (T Teaiwa 2010, 
117). This is because it promotes critical understandings of how things 
came to be, how they might be undone, and how “[they] could be done 
differently” (Wood and Kroger 2000, 14; see also T Teaiwa 2005).
My goal in analyzing Tuvaluan and Taiwanese discourse has not been 
to “shape intervention” or effect “a change in practice” regarding how 
this discourse is constructed. Instead, I hope to motivate change in the 
ways this discourse is analyzed or even to advocate that this discourse 
be more seriously considered in writing on Tuvalu-Taiwan, Pacific-Tai-
wan-PRC, and Pacific-Asia diplomacy. As Teresia Teaiwa cogently noted, 
scholarly attempts to answer questions “must account for specificities of 
nationality, culture, and history,” and, “quite simply, context matters” 
(2015, 1). I began my discussion by illustrating both the varied contexts 
constituting Tuvalu and Taiwan when they established diplomatic ties and 
how the Tuvalu-Taiwan relationship was imagined when Tuvalu and Tai-
wan encountered each other as national entities in the wake of Tuvalu’s 
independence. In doing so, I showed that, despite the teleological fash-
ion in which analysts might now imagine Taiwan-PRC competition in the 
Pacific, not forty years ago, discourse and relationships were uncertain, 
contingent, and defined by “multiple sites of trans-localism . . . tied to his-
tories dependent on the ocean” (Matsuda 2012, 5). By including discourse 
from the beginnings of Tuvalu-Taiwan relations, I further offset trends in 
current international-politics research that occlude local and contingent 
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connections in the Pacific-Asia region (Salesa 2016), thereby indicating 
complex networks that preceded, prompted, and continue to affect diplo-
matic relationships as we understand them today.
For both Tuvalu and Taiwan, early attempts at building government-
to-government ties were anchored in government-to-individual or gov-
ernment-to-group experiences that defined how higher-level relationships 
might proceed or that highlighted the necessity of forming official relation-
ships at a specific moment. This demonstrates how Pacific trans-localism 
contributed to the formation of diplomatic ties. Furthermore, although 
this early discourse cannot be consistently linked to more recent leader-
ship statements, it does suggest general confluences over time. That is, 
Taiwan is regularly tied to Tuvalu’s fisheries concerns and its concomitant 
mobilization of regional networks, while Tuvalu is consistently connected 
to Taiwan’s ambivalence regarding its proper international role and supe-
riority vis-à-vis the Pacific.
In sum, this article illustrates how shifting discursive articulations char-
acterize diplomatic relations and shows that processes of articulating and 
disarticulating are equally apparent in Taiwanese and Tuvaluan discourse. 
This analysis is thus particularly important because it recognizes the dis-
cursive agency of both Taiwan and Tuvalu. However, it is also critical in 
calling attention to how Taiwan is only one part of Tuvalu’s local, national, 
regional, and international imaginings, a reality often overlooked in anal-
ysis of Pacific-Taiwan-PRC diplomacy. This recognition moves against 
totalizing “[assumptions] of unequal power relations” and underscores 
Tuvalu’s agentic rather than instrumentalized role in diplomacy past and 
present (K Teaiwa 2007, 3–4).
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Notes
1 Teresia Teaiwa later recommended a critical empowerment rationale, in 
which “Pacific studies students [and scholars] . . . critically evaluate all forms 
and sources of power, including indigenous ones, and indeed, their own” (2017b, 
269). 
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2 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Taiwan government and many expatriates saw 
Taiwan as the seat of the Chinese government. Consequently, expatriates from 
Taiwan and mainland China are emphasized in 1974 reporting (Chiang 1982, 
55–56, 1987, 139; Sun 1980, 123).
3 See also Australia-Free China Society 1975; Chiang 1981.
4 For further fisheries statements, see Boreham 2016; Pita 2015a. For a posi-
tive regional statement on Taiwan, see Sopoaga 2016.
5 Although Tuvalu’s UN discourse on Taiwan may be prompted by the Tai-
wan government, Taiwan’s allies have always exerted agency in deciding whether 
to defend Taiwan at the United Nations (Fu 2007; udn 1995).
6 During martial law (1949–1987) and until 1996, presidents were elected by 
Taiwan’s National Assembly (Wang 2013, 82–83).
7 Because Tuvalu does not have political parties, I do not address party ideolo-
gies in the section on Tuvaluan leadership statements.
8 The discourse of Taiwan’s current president, Tsai Ing-wen, is not consid-
ered here because her term only began in May 2016. However, based on Tsai’s 
statements thus far, she takes a middle path between Chen and Ma. She empha-
sizes a common identity for Tuvalu, the Pacific, and Taiwan and the need to col-
lectively attain sustainable development, but she also uses Taiwan’s aid projects 
in Tuvalu and the Pacific to identify Taiwan as making useful contributions to 
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Abstract
In March 1979, Tuvalu’s government newspaper began an ongoing discussion of 
Tuvalu’s Asian diplomacy, highlighting the rapid development of relationships 
with East Asian nations like Taiwan shortly after Tuvalu’s independence in 1978. 
Contemporaneously, the Taiwan government began reporting on early diplomatic 
forays into Pacific nations, including Tuvalu. These newspaper and government 
reports are frequently characterized by a narrative style that suggests the com-
plexities of Pacific-Asia relationships at the time and that provides a foundation 
from which more recent discourse on Tuvalu-Taiwan relations can be contextu-
alized. In this paper, I adopt a Pacific studies rationale, articulation theory, and 
discourse analysis. I examine official Tuvaluan and Taiwanese narratives from 
the 1970s and 1980s to demonstrate how early diplomacy was determined not 
by official maneuvering but by preexisting trans-local connections. Subsequently, 
in analyzing Tuvaluan and Taiwanese leadership statements from 2000 to the 
present, I sketch how, more recently, Tuvalu and Taiwan have used each other to 
shape their national identities. However, I also highlight connections to earlier 
narratives, especially tension in Tuvaluan discourse due to fisheries conflicts with 
Taiwan and preoccupation in Taiwanese discourse regarding whether Taiwan is 
superior to Tuvalu. Finally, I demonstrate how articulations between early nar-
ratives and more recent discourse foreground Tuvaluan and Pacific agency and 
complicate assumed Asia-Pacific power hierarchies.
keywords: Tuvalu, Taiwan, diplomacy, official discourse, discourse analysis, 
articulation theory
